Tue 12th May 2026

Quantum Technologies and Global Supply Chains

Service: Patents

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Building on the role of investment and policy, we examine how the global trade in specialised hardware inputs underpins the industrial ecosystem that enables quantum technologies to be developed and scaled.

In our previous article, Dr. Shameena Bonomally and Damon Ho examined how investment flows and government initiatives are shaping the quantum technology landscape. Quantum technologies, however, do not develop in isolation. Behind any quantum system lies a broader hardware ecosystem involving specialised electronics, semiconductor fabrication equipment, precision instrumentation and advanced materials.

 

Examining how these inputs are produced and traded helps explain the industrial and technological base on which quantum development depends. The OECD–EPO report, “Mapping the Global Quantum Ecosystem”, approaches this question through international trade in “quantum-relevant goods.” These are inputs that play a role in the quantum value chain but are also widely used across other advanced industries, particularly semiconductor manufacturing. The resulting picture is less about the quantum market itself and more about the industrial infrastructure that enables quantum technology to be built and scaled.

 

Quantum Hardware Remains Embedded in Semiconductor Ecosystems

On the equipment side, a limited number of product categories dominate quantum global trade. Processors, other integrated circuits, and static converters account for the majority of exports relevant to the quantum value chain, while semiconductor fabrication equipment represents the most significant category outside electrical machinery. This concentration reflects the fact that the hardware ecosystem supporting quantum technologies is still largely embedded within the broader semiconductor and advanced electronics industries.

 

Integrated circuits and processors underpin the classical control electronics on which quantum systems rely. These electronics generate and process precisely shaped microwave or radio-frequency signals required to manipulate and read out qubits.

 

Static converters are solid-state power electronics devices such as rectifiers, inverters and converters that regulate or convert electrical voltage and current. They are widely used in laboratory infrastructure supporting quantum hardware, including electrical regulation systems and cryogenic environments.

 

Semiconductor fabrication equipment enables the production of micro- and nanoscale structures through processes such as lithography, thin-film deposition and etching. These techniques are central to the production of many quantum hardware platforms, including superconducting circuits, semiconductor spin qubits and photonic devices.

 

Because these technologies rely on manufacturing processes closely related to semiconductor production, trade flows in quantum-relevant equipment largely reflect existing electronics supply chains rather than a distinct quantum manufacturing sector. This suggests that countries already dominant in semiconductor infrastructure may possess a structural advantage in scaling quantum technologies.

 

Export Volumes and Structural Specialisation

Trade data shows that exports of quantum-relevant equipment are concentrated among a relatively small number of economies.

 

In 2022–2023, Taiwan, China, South Korea, the United States and Malaysia account for the largest export values in relation to quantum-relevant equipment.

 

However, absolute export volumes do not necessarily indicate structural specialisation. When integrated circuits are excluded, economies such as China, the United States, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands appear more prominent, particularly in areas such as fabrication equipment and specialised components.

 

To account for this, the report uses a Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) index, which compares a country’s share of exports in a given product with its share of global exports overall. Large export volumes may reflect the breadth of an economy, whereas RCA provides a clearer indication of where specialised capabilities are comparatively concentrated.

 

The RCA analysis reveals that some economies occupying strategically important positions in the quantum supply chain are not necessarily those leading in quantum patents or startup activity. Using this metric, Taiwan, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia and South Korea appear more significant through electronics manufacturing capability than through visible quantum R&D, illustrating how influence within the quantum ecosystem may emerge through supply-chain positioning rather than innovation alone.

 

Import Patterns and Industrial Structure

In 2022–2023, China was the largest importer of quantum-relevant equipment, followed by Singapore, the United States, Taiwan and South Korea. Across most economies, processors and other integrated circuits represent the largest quantum-relevant import categories. However, In the United States and Germany, static converters account for a relatively larger share of imports, illustrating a focus on power electronics.

 

Economies with significant semiconductor industries, including Taiwan, China and South Korea, also import substantial volumes of fabrication equipment, consistent with the requirements of advanced semiconductor manufacturing processes.

 

These import trends among semiconductor-focused economies show that, rather than forming an isolated supply chain, quantum technologies are developing within the same industrial ecosystems that already underpin semiconductor production and advanced electronics.

 

Raw Materials as Enabling Inputs

In addition to equipment, the report identifies a set of raw materials relevant to quantum technologies.

 

Five product categories account for more than 90% of the export value of quantum-relevant raw materials: foundry binders and industrial chemicals, aluminium, doped chemical compounds, aluminium oxide and oxometallic salts.

 

Foundry binders are binding agents used in casting and moulding processes. Doped chemical compounds are used in semiconductor doping where impurity atoms are introduced into a material to control its electrical properties. Aluminium oxide is used as a dielectric and insulating layer in semiconductor devices, and is also used in superconducting circuit structures. Oxometallic salts are used in material synthesis and thin-film deposition processes.

 

Again, many of these materials are closely linked to semiconductor and advanced electronics manufacturing, on which many quantum hardware platforms depend. This suggests that bottlenecks in quantum industrialisation may emerge from dependence on specialised semiconductor process chemicals and advanced manufacturing inputs already under supply-chain pressure.  

 

Geographic Distribution of Material Trade

In 2022–2023, China was the largest exporter of quantum-relevant raw materials, followed by Japan and South Korea.

 

China and Japan export significant quantities of foundry binders and doped chemical compounds, while South Korea is particularly prominent in oxometallic salts.

 

The raw material landscape also differs significantly from the better-known geography of quantum patenting and startups. Countries such as Australia, Brazil and India play strategically important roles through materials and industrial inputs rather than through visible leadership in quantum R&D itself. Australia (and to a lesser extent Brazil) is significant in aluminium oxide, while Russia, India and Canada are major exporters of aluminium.

 

On the import side, in 2022–2023, the United States is the largest importer, followed by China. The composition of imports varies by country, reflecting differences in industrial structure. Aluminium is a significant import in several advanced economies, while doped chemical compounds are more prominent in countries with strong semiconductor manufacturing sectors.

 

Concentration and Dependency in Supply Chains

Beyond trade volumes, the OECD-EPO report examines concentration and dependency using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) and a set of dependency criteria.

 

Several raw materials relevant to quantum technologies exhibit relatively high concentration levels, meaning that global supply is dominated by a limited number of countries. This is the case for products such as industrial diamonds, oxometallic salts, alkali metals, phosphides, isotopes and rare-earth metals.

 

Equipment products are generally less concentrated, although certain specialised categories show moderate concentration.

 

Dependency analysis provides a more detailed view of potential supply constraints. Static converters exhibit the highest number of dependencies in 2022–2023, with close to 50 economies relying on a strategically important supplier. In almost 40 of those cases, that supplier is China.

 

The picture that emerges is one where dependencies are not limited to obvious technology leaders. Australia occupies a strategically important position in aluminium oxide, South Korea in oxometallic salts, while China’s influence extends beyond finished electronics into upstream enabling inputs such as static converters, electrical connectors and industrial chemicals. This creates a layered form of dependency in which countries may develop domestic quantum capabilities while remaining reliant on external supply chains supporting fabrication and infrastructure. Overall, the OECD-EPO report identifies a clear increase in trade dependencies over time, suggesting that concentration risk may intensify as quantum-relevant supply chains mature.

 

Interpreting Trade Data in the Quantum Context

A central point in the report is that the trade flows analysed are not specific to quantum technologies, which are still deeply rooted in existing industrial ecosystems, particularly semiconductors. The path to scale will run through these supply chains.

 

Further, the RCA index shows that smaller economies can occupy critical roles in the quantum value chain, where specialisation and positioning matter more than size.

 

Lastly, emerging features of the quantum value chain include trade dependencies, particularly in quantum relevant materials and enabling components.

 

For a field often framed in terms of breakthroughs and algorithms, this is a useful reminder! The direction of quantum innovation is not determined solely by advances in physics, but on the infrastructure, materials and manufacturing capabilities that sit beneath the technology.

 

The OECD-EPO report ultimately points towards a more industrial reality: the future of quantum technologies may depend as much on access to semiconductor infrastructure, advanced manufacturing capability, and resilient supply chains as on progress in quantum physics itself.

 

From Physics to Industrial Reality

Across this series, we have considered quantum technologies from multiple perspectives: the underlying physics, the organisations developing them, the investment shaping their trajectory, and finally the industrial systems that support them.

 

A consistent picture emerges. Quantum technologies are advancing rapidly, but their development is not determined by physics alone. It depends equally on engineering constraints, organisational structures, access to capital, and the availability of specialised industrial inputs.

 

At present, the quantum ecosystem remains closely tied to existing technological infrastructures. Whether and how the field transitions beyond this dependence will be a defining question in the coming years.

 

For now, quantum technologies can be understood not as a fully formed industry, but as an emerging layer within a broader technological system, one whose evolution will continue to reflect both scientific progress and the industrial frameworks in which it is embedded.

 

What does this mean in practice for Quantum and IP?

The picture that emerges is one in which quantum technologies are shaped not only by scientific progress, but by the structure of the industrial systems that support them. Innovation, manufacturing capability and supply‑chain power are often located in different places, creating a more complex strategic landscape than the sector’s research geography alone would suggest.

 

For businesses, this has practical implications. Intellectual property strategies should not focus solely on where R&D is conducted, but also on where critical inputs are produced, where dependencies lie, and where future value may be captured.

 

At Page White Farrer, we work with clients in the complex world of quantum technologies, helping them protect their innovation, and supporting them with patent drafting and prosecution, IP strategy and wider IP issues in the sector.  If you would like to discuss this further, please contact Tom Mahon.

Authors

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